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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20080378-CA

vs.
KENDRA & TIMOTHY MABEY,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Timothy and Kendra Mabey's motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents
a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P. 3d
699. This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress (R2. 60-54).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's
Brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Timothy and Kendra Mabey appeal from the judgment and sentences of the
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth District Court, after the denial of their motions to
suppress and Timothy's conviction of possession with intent to manufacture or produce a
controlled substance, a third degree felony by a Sery guilty plea and Kendra's conviction
of (Insert conviction) also by a Sery guilty plea.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Timothy Mabey was charged by criminal information filed on April 20, 2007 in
Fourth District Court with possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug free zone
with a prior conviction, a third degree felony, possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, production of marijuana, a controlled substance in a
drug free zone, a second degree felony, and endangerment of child or elder adult, a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37a-5(l), 5837-8(l)(a)(i) and 76-5-112.5 respectively (R. 05-06). Kendra Mabey was charged by
criminal information filed on April 20, 2007 in Fourth District Court with possession or
use of marijuana, a controlled substance in a drugfreezone, a class A misdemeanor,
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drugfreezone, a class A misdemeanor, production
of marijuana, a controlled substance in a drugfreezone, a second degree felony, and
endangerment of child or elder adult, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(d), 58-37a-5(l), 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) and 76-5-112.5 respectively (R2.
05-06):
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At the preliminary hearing held on June 13, 2007, the Court found probable cause
in the case of Timothy Mabey, with the exception of count 4, endangerment of a child or
elder adult, and counts 1-3 were bound over for trial (R. 27-25). The court also found
probable cause in the case of Kendra Mabey on all counts and the charges were bound
over for trial (R2. 29-28).
Defense counsel filed a joint motion to suppress on August 15, 2007 (R2. 40-37).
Counsel argued that Officer Hurst's entry was unlawful and that all evidence found as a
result was inadmissible (R2. 39-38). Counsel also argued that the evidence seized after
the officer obtained consent was tainted with illegality (R2. 39-38). In its response, filed
September 26, 2007, the State argued that both probable cause and exigent circumstances
existed at the time of Officer's Hurst's entry into the house, making a warrantless search
of the home lawful (R. 41-39) (R2. 50-44). The State asserted that the marijuana was
discovered in plain view and lawfully seized (R. 39). In addition, the State argued that
because consent was given and no prior search tainted the evidence with illegality, that
all evidence discovered is admissible (R. 39-38). Defense counsel's reply, filed
November 16, 2007, argued that the search of the home was unlawful because although
probable cause may have existed, exigent circumstances did not (R. 51-48) (R2. 60-54).
On December 11, 2007, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the
Mabeys' joint motion to suppress (R. 64-53) (R2. 71-64). The court held that the first
search of the home was lawful and that the officer had probable cause and exigent
circumstances (R. 61-60) (R2. 68-67). The court held that the second warrantless search
of the home was unconstitutional due to an absence of exigent circumstances (R. 60-59)
3

(R2. 67-66). The third search was held to be constitutional, even though it followed an
illegal search of the home (R. 59) (R2. 66). The court based this ruling on the fact that
consent was obtained through knowledge that had been obtained through the first lawful
search and therefore was untainted by the second unlawful search (R. 59) (R2. 66).
Evidence obtained as a result of the second search was ruled inadmissible as far as there
actually was any evidence obtainedfromthat search, but all other evidence would be
admissible (R. 58) (R2. 65).
On February 13, 2008, Timothy Mabey waived his right to a jury trial and pled
guilty to a third degree felony, possession with intent to manufacture or produce a
controlled substance, for which the State agreed to enter his conviction as one class A
misdemeanor upon the successful completion of probation (R. 72-69). Also on February
13, 2008, Kendra Mabey waived her right to a jury trial and pled guilty to a third degree
felony, possession with intent to manufacture or produce a controlled substance, for
which the State agreed to enter her conviction as one class A misdemeanor upon the
successful completion of probation (R2. 85-76). The guilty pleas were Sery pleas that
allow the Mabeys to appeal the Court's denial of their motion to suppress the evidence
against them (R. 81-73) (R2. 85-77).
On March 26, 2008, Timothy Mabey was given a suspended sentence of up to five
years in prison, ordered to spend 60 days in the Utah County Jail with the GPS program
authorized, placed on probation for 36 months, and ordered to pay $950fine,plus
surcharge and interest (R. 86-83). Kendra Mabey was given a suspended sentence of up
to five years in prison, ordered to spend 60 days in the Utah County Jail with the GPS
4

program authorized, placed on probation for 36 months, and ordered to pay $950 fine,
plus surcharge and interest (R2. 92-90).
On April 24, 2008, Notices of Appeal were filed with the Fourth District Court (R.
90) (R2. 96).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On April 15, 2007, Officer Jay Hurst was dispatched to the Mabey home on a
medical detail (R. 110:4). When he arrived at the location the ambulance crew was
already there and were loading the patient, Tammy Wilbanks (Kendra Mabey's mother),
into the ambulance (R. 110:5). Officer Hurst was approached by one of the ambulance
crew and told that there was marijuana in the home (R. 110:5). Officer Hurst also saw
marijuana sticking to the ambulance stretcher as they were loading the patient onto the
ambulance (R. 110:5).
Officer Hurst then asked the ambulance crewmember to show him where the
marijuana was at in the residence (R. 110:6). The two entered the home and went into the
master bedroom (R. 110:6). In the bedroom he saw ashtrays with burnt marijuana joints,
a marijuana pipe (R. 110:6). The crewmember then explained that while looking for the
patient's insulin she had entered the master bathroom and found marijuana plants (R.
110:6). Officer Hurst then entered the bathroom and also saw the marijuana plants on the
counter (R. 110:6). After that he froze the environment, went through the house to make
sure there were no other occupants in the residence (R. 110:7). After seeing that no one
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else was in the home, he went over to a neighbor's residence to obtain the children's
information (R. 110:8).
He also contacted Sergeant Smith of the Payson Police Department (R. 110:8).
After Sergeant Smith arrived at the home, Sergeant Smith requested to be shown the
items Officer Hurst was describing (R. 110:27). He stated that he "needed to see" and the
two, along with Officer Shaw, reentered the home (R. 110:16, 27). Officer Hurst showed
the other two what he had seen earlier and they exited the house (R. 110:16).
Timothy and Kendra Mabey then arrived at the home and were approached by the
officers (R. 110:24). They were separated and told that an ambulance had come to take
Ms. Wilbanks away, that she was fine, and that the ambulance crew had shown the
officers several items of drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and two marijuana plants (R.
110:24). He then gave the Mabeys a choice of giving consent to search or waiting for a
search warrant (R. 110:25). Sergeant Smith told each of them what he had seen in the
home from plain view and that the items were going to be taken out either way and they
were going to be arrested (R. 110:25). He then informed them that the only difference
between their giving consent and obtaining a warrantfromthe Judge would be time (R.
110:25). After speaking with each other the Mabeys signed the consent form to search
their home (R. 110:25).
While speaking with Sergeant Smith about the search of the home, Kendra Mabey
admitted that she smokes marijuana "because she needs to cope" (R. 110:26). Ms. Mabey
also indicated that the large tin the officers say was kind of like a group tin and that all
three, Timothy, Kendra, and Kendra's mother, Tammy Wilbanks, used everything-in it
6

(R. 110:26-27). She also admitted that the three had smoked marijuana that morning in
the room (R. 110:27). She informed Sergeant Smith that the plants were not hers and that
she was taking care of them for her brother who was on juvenile probation (R. 110:27).
Timothy Mabey also admitted to caring for the plants (R. 110:14). Officer Hurst also
testified that when he asked Kendra if she had any marijuana on her that she told him she
had some marijuana in her purse that she had purchased and that it was in the vehicle
they were driving (R 110:11).
After obtaining consent, the police again entered the home a third time (R.
110:26). Sergeant Smith testified that he could smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana in
the bedroom and that on the bed were two tins, and in plain view of those tins were
marijuana pipes and ashtrays and marijuana (R. 110:24-25). He also testified that in the
bathroom were two marijuana plants sitting on the counter (R. 110:25). The officers took
photographs and removed all of the itemsfromthe home (R. 110:26). They also found
two photographs - one of Kendra Mabey and one of Timothy Mabey - smoking what
appeared to be marijuana joints (R. 110:30).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the partial denial of Timothy and Kendra Mabey's
motion to suppress and vacate their condition guilty plea because the evidence against
them was obtained through unlawful searches and seizure of their personal property.
The Mabey home was unreasonably searched within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because a warrantless search was performed without"the necessary exigent
7

circumstances needed in addition to probable cause. The home was searched at the
request of the officer to see the marijuana, not because the officer was concerned about
the safety of himself or others or that evidence was at risk of being damaged, destroyed,
or secreted by an unknown individual in the home.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of evidence by the police was not performed
with legally valid consent given by the Mabeys. The consent given was tainted by the
previous illegality of the prior searches and therefore does not meet the requirements of
the consent exception as required for the police to perform a warrantless search of the
home with the defendants' consent.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Searches of the Mabey Home were Unconstitutional and the Evidence
Obtained Therefrom Should have been Suppressed.
The warrant requirements of the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the

United States of America were created to protect c[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
United States Constitution, Amend IV; Utah Constitution Art.I, § 14. "As the United
States Supreme Court has stated, c . . . [P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" State v. Duran, 2007
UT 23, % 6, 156 P.3d 795 (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
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Therefore, searches performed "outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). There are only two of these exceptions that
are relevant to the case at hand: exigent circumstances and the consent exception.

A. There were not exigent circumstances allowing the officers) to search the
Mabeys' home without a warrant.
The exigent circumstances exception applies "where probable cause and exigent
circumstances are proven." State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219 ^[ 24, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997)). Although Officer Hurst did have
probable cause to search the home, there were not exigent circumstances and the initial
search of the home was unconstitutional.
The U.S. Supreme Court as has defined exigent circumstances, "specially
pressing or urgent law enforcement need[s]." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331,
121 S.Ct 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701
(1983)). This Court in State v. Beavers further defined exigent circumstances as existing
where the delay in obtaining a warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the officers or other
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, or the escape of the suspect/" 859 P.2d 9,
26 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted).
An example of exigent circumstances is "the need to protect or preserve life or
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avoid serious injury." Mincey v. Arizona, 431 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d
290 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 241 (1963)). Under
the emergency aid doctrine, as this example of exigent circumstances is often termed,
warrantless search is lawful if the following requirements are met:"(l) Police have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and believe there is an
immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life; (2) The search is not
primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence; (3) There is some reasonable
basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched; That is, there must
be a connection with the area to be searched and the emergency." State v. Comer, 2002
UTApp2191f5, 51P.3d55.
Unlike the Comer case in which the court ruled the warrantless entry lawful
because officers entered the home after receiving a call about domestic violence and
observing the unusual behavior of the wife when she spoke with the police outside the
home and suddenly and unexpectedly went back into the home, this is not a case in which
the officer had a "reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be
searched."
In the Comer case officers had reason to fear for the wife's safety based on the fact
that they had been called about a domestic disturbance and she had informed them her
husband was inside the home before unexpectedly and in the middle of a conversation
leaving and reentering the home. In the present case, however, there was no need to
protect life or avoid serious injury or to believe that there was. Officer Hurst entered the
home-for the primary purpose of seizing evidence, axlear violation of the second
10

requirement of the emergency aid doctrine. Wilbanks had already received proper
treatment and was outside the home when he arrived at the scene. Officer Hurst testified
that Wilbanks did not require his assistance in her medical treatment at the time of his
arrival (R. 110:22). In fact, the police report indicates that the officers were not
dispatched to the Mabey residence until after the patient had been attended to and the
ambulance crew discovered the marijuana. The officer's entry could not be based on a
need to protect life or avoid serious injury, therefore, no exigent circumstances exist
under the emergency aid doctrine.
Another example of exigent circumstances is the prevention of the destruction of
evidence, but only when offices have a reasonable belief that such destruction is certain
to occur. Duran, 2007 UT 23 at 1f8.
In State v. Duran the Utah Supreme Court examined exigent circumstances in
terms of the destruction of evidence aspect. After a report from family members that
marijuana was being smoked at another family member's residence the police responded
to the home. Duran, 2007 UT 23 at \ 2. When the officers arrived they were told by a
person present at the scene that people in the home were smoking marijuana and also
warned that there were weapons in the home that the homeowner had threatened to use
against the police. Id. Upon approaching the home, the officers also smelled the odor of
marijuana being smoked and concluded that the evidence was in the process of being
destroyed/consumed and entered the home. Id. at f3. The Court held that these
circumstances did not amount to exigent circumstances and that the warrantless search of
the home was unlawful. Id. at ^[8, The Court ruled that "there is an exclusive, limited
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roster of exceptions to the requirement that a warrant be secured before a lawful search
can occur" and they declined to add to that the circumstances of this case. Id. at \A. The
court further ruled that exigent circumstances for purposes of warrantless entry do not
include "the mere possibility that evidence may be destroyed." Id. at ^[8 (quoting State v.
South, 885 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'don other grounds, 924 P.2d 354
(Utah 1996)).
There is no evidence that before his initial search Officer Hurst saw anyone or had
reason to believe that there was anyone in the home that could destroy or secrete
evidence, much less a belief that would amount to the standard as outlined in Duran.
From his testimony at the preliminary hearing it appears as though someone told him
prior to his search of the home that Wilbanks was tending the children who were at home
and that the defendants were not at home. In fact, Officer Hurst testified that he saw the
children outside on the front lawn and was informed that another child was at a
neighbor's house to the south (R. 110:15). He also made no effort to speak with the
patient, Tammy Wilbanks, to ask if other people could be inside the home before he
searched the home (R. 110:21). In the case of Duran the officers knew that there were
people in the home but this still did not provide a basis for a warrantless search. There is
nothing from Officer Hurst's testimony to suggest that he had even considered the
destruction of evidence as even a "mere possibility," much less that such a suspicion
would amount to a reasonable belief of the nature to justify a warrantless entry.
Officer Hurst's primary motivation for entering the house was to view the
marijuana discovered by emergency personnel He testified that he "asked the crew
12

member to show [him] where the marijuana was at in the residence." (R. 110:6). He made
no indication that he was concerned about the destruction of evidence and only after
being shown the marijuana by the crewmember did he perform a cursory search of the
home for other people. No evidence was presented to the Court to support any inference
that Officer Hurst reasonably believed that any other person could have been inside the
home before his initial search, much less that such person could damage, destroy or
secrete evidence. Therefore, there could not have been exigent circumstances based on a
reasonable belief that the destruction of evidence was certain to occur.

B. The search of the home after consent was given was tainted by the previous
illegality of prior searches.
In making the determination of whether or not the consent exception applies, the court
applies a two-part test outlined by the Court of Appeals in State v. Sepulveda. To qualify
for the exception, both of the following requirements must be satisfied: "(1) the consent
must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation
of the prior illegality." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992) (citation
omitted). The second part of the test applies "when 'antecedent police illegality exists/"
Id (citation omitted).
Whether consent is voluntary "is a fact sensitive issue to be determined by
examining the totality of the circumstances,' including 'the specific characteristics of the
accused and the details of the police conduct.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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The search of the Mabeys' home does not meet the requirements of the consent
exception. First the consent was not voluntarily given. Sergeant Smith testified that he
told both defendants that the only difference between consent and a warrant was time. (R
110:25). The Mabeys were faced with a situation in which they believed their only option
was to allow their home to be searched.
Even if consent was voluntarily given, the subsequent consent does not cure the
original illegality of the prior searches. The first search is unconstitutional based on a
lack of exigent circumstances justifying Officer Hurst's initial entry into the house. There
is no evidence before the court that would suggest he had a reasonable belief that
evidence could be destroyed or that his presence in the home was needed to protect life or
avoid serious injury.
However, even if the first search was constitutional the second search was
unconstitutional, as the lower court has found. There was no justification for Officer
Hurst reentering the home accompanied by Sergeant Smith and Officer Shaw. The home
had been secured and the officers knew with certainty that there was no danger of
evidence being destroyed. The second search of the home directly played into the
Mabeys' giving consent to the search of the home and is therefore an element to be
considered in the context of their consent. Sergeant Smith exploited knowledge gained by
the prior illegality of the second search to obtain both Timothy and Kendra Mabey's
consent. He told both defendants the items he had seen inside the home and that
"obviously they were illegal [and] [t]hat we needed to take them out of the home." (R.
110:25). Sergeant Smith was only present at the second seaifch of the home and without.
14

the knowledge he gained as a product of this search would not have been able to inform
the Mabeys of the items found in their home. Without this information the decision the
Mabeys made at that time could have been different and in any case this illegality would
nullify the validity of their consent. There is no way for the Court to separate the
knowledge and subsequent actions of Sergeant Smith gained as a result of the second
illegal search and his use of that knowledge in obtaining the defendants' consent from the
first search of the home by Officer Hurst, if it were to find the first search lawful.
Therefore, the consent given by the Mabeys was not valid as it was tainted by the
illegality of the prior searches of their home.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Kendra and Timothy Mabey respectfully request that
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress and vacate the
conditional Sery pleas, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further
proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11 TH day of March, 2009.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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DEC 112007

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OTSSBT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' JOINT
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 071401686
CASE NO. 071401687

KENDRA MABEY,
TIMOTHY MABEY,
Defendants.

DATE: December 11,2007
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
On August 15, 2007, counsel for Defendants, Anthony Howell, filed Defendants' Joint
Motion and Memorandum to Suppress. On September 26, 2007, Donna Kelly, Utah County
Attorney, filed the State's Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Suppress. On November 16, 2007, Anthony Howell filed Defendants' Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Suppress. The parties submitted the matter on the pleadings.
The Court, having carefully reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and the pleadings, rules
as follows:
I.
Facts
The Court notes that there is an absence of facts which might have bearing on the
decision of the Court. A preliminary hearing was conducted in this case on June 13, 2007 and
both parties have cited to the record. However, neither party has requested an evidentiary
hearing and neither has requested oral argument in this case. With that background, the Court
determines the following facts:

1.

On April 15, 2007, Officer Jay Hurst responded to a medical detail at the Defendants'
home.

2.

When Officer Hurst arrived at the home, Defendant Kendra Mabey's mother, Tammy
Willbanks, was there. She had experienced a seizure. EMTs were attending to her and
lifting her into an ambulance.

3.

As the EMTs were lifting Ms. Willbanks into the ambulance, Officer Hurst observed
marijuana on the stretcher.

4.

Before the seizure, Ms. Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' children.

5.

An EMT told Officer Hurst that there was marijuana in the home.

6.

Officer Hurst asked the reporting EMT to show him the marijuana. The EMT took
Officer Hurst to the master bedroom.

7.

Officer Hurst saw burnt marijuana joints and a marijuana pipe in the master bedroom.

8.

In addition, he saw marijuana plants on the counter in the master bathroom.

9.

Officer Hurst then "froze" the environment. He went through the home making sure
there were no occupants inside.

10.

Officer Hurst called Sergeant Lance Smith.

11.

When Sergeant Smith arrived, Officer Hurst took him inside the home and showed him
what was in plain view. This second plain view search lasted approximately five
minutes.

12.

After the plain view search, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith went back outside and
waited for the Defendants to arrive.

13.

When the Defendants arrived, the officers explained that they were called to the home
2

because Ms. Willbanks had had a seizure. They also explained that upon their arrival at
the home, an EMT told them there was marijuana in the home. Finally, they explained
that they had gone inside the home and seen marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view.
The officers Mirandized the Defendants. Both Defendants then signed a consent form
allowing the search of their home.
14.

During the subsequent search, Officer Hurst discovered a photograph of Mr. Mabey
smoking a marijuana joint and a photograph of Ms. Mabey smoking a marijuana joint.
II.
Legal Analysis
In this case, officers searched the Defendants' home, without a warrant, three times.

Officer Hurst performed a plain view search in connection with his sweep of the home after
observing marijuana on the ambulance stretcher and being informed by the EMT that there was
marijuana in the home. When Sergeant Smith arrived at the scene, he and Officer Hurst
performed a second plain view search. Finally, after the Defendants arrived at the scene and
signed a consent form allowing the search of their home, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith
performed a more thorough search.
Searches performed '"outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687
(Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions relevant
in this case are the exigent circumstances exception and the consent exception.
The exigent circumstances exception applies "where probable cause and exigent
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circumstances are proven." State v. Comer, 51 P.3d 55, 64 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v.
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Probable cause exists where the facts and
circumstances known to the officers are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Id. at 63 (quoting State v. Dorsey, 731
P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)). Exigent circumstances exist where the delay in obtaining a
warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant
evidence, or the escape of the suspect.'" State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(citation omitted).
To determine whether the consent exception applies, courts apply a two-part test: '"(1)
the consent must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality.'" State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)(citation omitted). The second part of the test only applies "when 'antecedent police
illegality exists.'" Id. (citation omitted). Whether consent is voluntary '"is a fact sensitive issue
to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances,' including 'the specific
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Factors that indicate a lack of coercion in obtaining consent include "the officer's lack 'of a claim
of authority to search,' 'the absence of an exhibition of force' by the officer, 'the officer's mere
request to search,'" the defendant's '"cooperation"' and "the officer's lack of 'deception.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
A.
Search No. 1
The first plain view search performed by Officer Hurst was supported by probable cause
4

and exigent circumstances. Officer Hurst saw marijuana on the ambulance stretcher. In addition,
the EMT told him that there was marijuana in the home. These facts and circumstances were
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been
committed. Therefore, the search was supported by probable cause. Officer Hurst also knew
Ms. Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' children. Nothing in the record suggests that
Officer Hurst knew how many children the Defendants' had or whether they had all been
removed from the home. The delay in obtaining a warrant would have risked potential physical
harm to the children from the exposure to drugs if there were indeed children in the home.
Moreover, if the officers had locked down the home with children still inside, the children could
have suffered emotional trauma. In addition, the search of the home was authorized to remove
anyone who might damage, destroy, or secrete the evidence. The Court notes that the subject
evidence could have been easily destroyed, damaged, or secreted by anyone in the home.
Therefore, the search was supported by exigent circumstances. Because the first plain view
search performed by Officer Hurst was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, it
was constitutionally permissible despite the absence of a warrant.
B.
Search No. 2
Although the second plain view search performed by Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith
was supported by probable cause, it was not supported by exigent circumstances. During the first
plain view search, Officer Hurst saw burnt marijuana joints and a marijuana pipe in the master
bedroom. In addition, he saw marijuana plants on the counter in the master bathroom. These
facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that
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an offense had been committed. Therefore, the search was supported by probable cause.
However, because, prior to the second plain view search, Officer Hurst had already swept the
home and assured that there was no one inside, the delay in obtaining a search warrant would not
have risked physical harm to anyone. Nor would it have risked the destruction of relevant
evidence or the escape of the suspects, as the scene had already been secured. Therefore, the
second plain view search was not supported by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the search
was unconstitutional.
C.
Search No. 3
The third search was supported by consent. When the Defendants arrived at the scene the
officers explained the situation and Mirandized them. The Defendants then signed a consent
form allowing the search of their home. Nothing in the record indicates that the consent was
involuntary on the part of either Defendant or that the officers deceived the Defendants. The
officers explained that they were called to the home because Ms. Willbanks had had a seizure.
They further explained that upon their arrival at the home, an EMT told them there was
marijuana in the home. Finally, they explained that they had gone inside the home and seen
marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view. After being advised of these facts and circumstances,
both Defendants signed a consent form allowing the search of their home. Although the consent
was obtained after the officers performed an illegal search of the home (the second search), it
was supported by an explanation of facts known to Officer Hurst as a result of his initial, legal
search of the home. In other words, the Defendants' consent was not obtained by police
exploitation of the illegal second search. Therefore, the consent was lawfully obtained.
6

III.
Decision
Defendants' Joint Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. The initial
plain view search of the Defendants' home was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances. The third search was supported by consent. Therefore, to the extent Defendants'
Motion relates to evidence discovered as a direct result of those searches, their Motion is denied.
However, the second plain view search was not supported by exigent circumstances or any other
exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the second plain view search was
unconstitutional. Therefore, to the extent the Defendants' Motion relates to evidence discovered
as a direct result of that search, their Motion is granted. Because these Motions were submitted
on the memoranda without an evidentiary hearing and without oral argument, it is unclear what
evidence, if any, was discovered during the second search.
By the Court,

Judge Lynn W. Davis
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